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 26 Id.
 27 Id.
 28 Id.
 29 Id.
 30 Id.
 31 Id.
 32 Id.
 33 Id.
 34 Act, Sec. 812, eliminating I.R.C. § 25B(h).
 35 Act, Sec. 1304.
 36	The	Act	does	not	define	“good	condition.”		
 37 Act, Sec. 1217, amending I.R.C. § 170(f), effective for tax years 
beginning after Aug. 17, 2006.
 38 Act, Sec. 1201, amending I.R.C. § 408(d).  The provision is 
inapplicable for any portion of a withdrawal that would have been 
otherwise taxable.  Id.  
 39 Act, Sec. 1202, amending I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(C)(iv), effective 
for contributions made after 2005 and before 2008.
 40 Act, Sec. 1204, amending I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(D)(iv), effective 
for contributions made after 2005 and before 2008.
 41 Act, Sec. 1206, adding I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i), and redesignating 
existing paragraphs (E) and (F) as (F) and (G), effective for tax years 
through 2007.
 42	The	term	“qualified	farmer	or	rancher”	means	a	taxpayer	whose	
gross	income	from	the	trade	or	business	of	farming	as	defined	by	
I.R.C. § 2032(e)(5) exceeds 50 percent of the taxpayer’s gross 
income for the tax year.
 43 Act, Sec. 1206, adding I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv), and 
redesignating existing paragraphs (E) and (F) as (F) and (G), effective 
for tax years through 2007.
 44 Act, Sec. 1203, amending I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2), effective for 
contributions made in tax years after Dec. 31, 2005, and before 
January 1, 2008.
 45 Act, Sec. 1219, amending I.R.C. § § 6662, 6664, and adding 
I.R.C.	§	6695A,	effective	for	returns	filed	and	appraisals	prepared	
with	respect	to	returns	or	submissions	filed	after	Aug.	17,	2006.
2006.
 9 An “at-risk” plan is (1) less than 80 percent funded, without 
regard to at-risk liabilities; and (2) less than 70 percent funded 
counting at-risk liabilities.  
 10 Act, Sec. 401.
 11 Act, Sec. 302, amending 29 U.S.C. § 1055(g)(3) and I.R.C. § 
417(e)(3), effective for plan years beginning after 2007.
 12 Act, Sec. 903, amending I.R.C. § 414.
 13 Under current law, employee contributions to traditional pension 
plans are not tax deferred.  Thus, few pension plans require or permit 
employee contributions.  Instead, many employers supplement their 
pension plans with separate 401(k) plans which permit employees 
to defer taxes on their contributions.
 14 Act, Sec. 903, amending I.R.C. § 414.
 15 Id.
 16 Id.
 17 The conversion impacts older employees to a greater degree 
inasmuch as an older employee has fewer years to build up savings. 
But, an employer’s alternative to switching to a hybrid plan may be 
to leave employees with no pension plan at all.
 18 Act, Sec. 601, amending 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b), effective for 
advice provided after December 31, 2006.
 19 Act, Sec. 830.  Also, in I.R. 2006-85 (May 31, 2006), IRS 
announced that, effective January 2007, taxpayers could split 
their refunds and deposit them in as many as three different bank 
accounts.  IRS will issue new Form 8888 for taxpayers to use to 
split	their	refunds	in	time	for	the	2007	filing	season.		
 20 Act, Sec. 827, amending I.R.C. § 72(t)(2), effective for 
distributions after September 11, 2001.
 21 Id.
 22 Act, Sec. 826.  The rules are to be consistent with hardship 
withdrawals now allowed for spouses and I.R.C. § 152 dependents. 
Id.
 23 Act, Sec. 829, amending I.R.C. § 402(c), applicable for 
distributions after 2006.
 24 Act, Sec. 824, amending I.R.C. § 408A(e), effective for 
distributions after 2007.  
 25 Act, Sec. 811.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
AnIMALS
 BULL. The plaintiffs were injured when their car struck the 
defendant’s bull on a highway near the defendant’s farm. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because 
of absence of any evidence of negligence by the defendant, 
particularly in maintaining the fences. The appellate court stated 
that the duty of an animal owner was to prevent an animal from 
escaping onto a highway if the owner could reasonably anticipate 
that the animal could escape and stray onto a highway. The court 
noted that the defendant had admitted that the bull involved had 
escaped at least once before and that the defendant did not check 
on the bull during the day of the accident. The court also noted 
that other factors should be considered in determining whether 
the defendant had acted reasonably, including the proximity of 
the	highway,	the	amount	of	traffic	on	the	highway,	the	time	of	day	
and other surrounding conditions. The court reversed the grant of 
summary	judgment,	holding	that	sufficient	issues	of	fact	remained	to	
be determined before the defendant could be considered, as a matter 
of law, to have acted reasonably in the methods chosen to prevent 
the bull from escaping.  The plaintiffs also argued that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur should apply in the case to impose liability on 
the defendant; however, the appellate court  refused to rule on this 
issue until the trial court had an opportunity to rule on remand of 
the case.  Casillas v. Schubauer, 714 n.W.2d 84 (S.D. 2006).
 HORSES. The plaintiff was injured while riding a horse owned 
by the defendants. The defendants operated a riding stable, providing 
horses for recreational riding. During the morning of the accident, 
the plaintiff rode a horse as part of a cattle roundup. In the afternoon, 
the plaintiff was invited to participate in a horse roundup but was 
injured when the horse began to run upon seeing the other horses. 
The plaintiff brought suit under the Colorado Equine Activities Act, 
Colo. Stat. § 13-21-119, alleging that the defendant provided a horse 
beyond the plaintiff’s riding skills level. The trial court gave a jury 
instruction that the sponsor of an equine event would be liable only 
if a claimant proves that the sponsor failed to make reasonable efforts 
to determine both the participant’s ability to engage in an activity 
and the participant’s ability to manage an animal. The jury returned 
a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that 
the jury instruction was improper. The court agreed, holding that 
the instruction did not include the duty of the defendant to also take 
reasonable steps to determine whether the plaintiff was experienced 
enough to participate in the horse riding activity in which the accident 
occurred. Here the plaintiff showed that the plaintiff had informed the 
defendant of the plaintiff’s limited riding experience and that either 
the horse or the horse roundup activity were dangerous in relation to 
the plaintiff’s experience level.  The court reversed the jury verdict 
and remanded the case for a new trial.  Waneka v. Clyncke, 134 
P.3d 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
 BAnkRUPTCy
FEDERAL TAXATIOn
 ADMInISTRATIVE EXPEnSES. A bankruptcy estate incurred 
administrative expenses and sought to deduct the expenses from 
adjusted gross income of the estate without limitation. The IRS 
acknowledged that I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) allowed the expenses of 
administering an estate to be deducted from adjusted gross income 
and not as miscellaneous expenses subject to the 2 percent of 
adjusted gross income limitation of I.R.C. § 67(a). The IRS also 
acknowledged that In re Miller, 252 B.R.110 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000), 
held that Section 67(e)(1) applied to bankruptcy estates as well as 
decedent’s estates. The IRS, in a Chief Counsel Advice letter, held 
that a bankruptcy estate could deduct administrative expenses from 
adjusted gross income without the limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 
67(a).  CCA Ltr. Rul. 200630016, June 30, 2006.
 REFUnDS. 	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7	in	January	2005	and	
included	tax	claims	for	1998,	1999,	and	2000.	The	debtor	filed	the	
2004 income tax return later in that same month. The 2004 return 
included a claim for a refund and the debtor listed the refund as 
exempt property. The IRS refused to pay the refund claim and used 
the refund to offset the tax claims. The debtor argued that the refund 
claim	did	not	arise	until	the	income	tax	return	was	filed,	making	the	
refund claim a post-petition claim, lacking mutuality with the pre-
petition tax claims. The court held that the refund claim arose on 
December	31,	2004	and	not	when	the	income	tax	return	was	filed;	
therefore, the refund claim and tax claims existed pre-petition and 
the IRS had the right to set off the refund against the tax claims and 
was not required to pay the refund. In re Beaucage, 342 B.R. 408 
(D. Mass. 2006), aff’g, 334 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
 TAX LIEnS. The debtor was audited by the IRS and assessed 
unpaid taxes for 1981 through 1984. When the debtor moved to 
Florida	in	1995,	the	IRS	filed	a	tax	lien	in	Florida	for	the	assessed	
taxes.	The	debtor	filed	 for	Chapter	 7	 in	 1999	 and	filed	 a	motion	
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that the taxes were dischargeable, which was granted. During the 
bankruptcy	case,	the	tax	lien	expired	and	the	IRS	re-filed	the	tax	
lien.	The	debtor	filed	a	motion	 to	 release	 the	 tax	 liens,	 arguing	
that	the	re-filing	of	the	liens	violated	the	automatic	stay.	The	court	
held	that	the	re-filing	of	the	tax	liens	did	not	violate	the	automatic	
stay	because	the	re-filing	did	not	create,	perfect	or	enforce	a	lien	
but merely continued an existing pre-petition lien. The debtor 
also argued that, even if the tax lien remained enforceable, the 
lien should be limited to the value of the debtor’s property on 
the petition date. The court noted that, although the debtor was 
personally discharged from the taxes, the tax lien remained in 
effect against the debtor’s property after bankruptcy. In addition, 
the court noted that, under Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), 
any post-petition increase in value of secured property accrues to 
the lienholder; therefore, the tax lien was not limited to the value 
of the debtor’s property on the petition date.  In re O’Callaghan, 
342 B.R. 364 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS
 FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics Service 
has	issued	farm	employment	figures	as	of	August	18,	2006.	There	
were 1,202,000 hired workers on the nation’s farms and ranches 
the week of July 9-15, 2006, down 11 percent from a year ago. Of 
these hired workers, 875,000 workers were hired directly by farm 
operators. Agricultural service employees on farms and ranches 
made up the remaining 327,000 workers.  Farm operators paid their 
hired workers an average wage of $9.74 per hour during the July 
2006 reference week, up 36 cents from a year earlier.  Field workers 
received an average of $8.95 per hour, up 34 cents from April 2005, 
while livestock workers earned $9.30 per hour compared with $9.14 
a	year	earlier.		The	field	and	livestock	worker	combined	wage	rate,	
at $9.56 per hour, was up 30 cents from last year. The number of 
hours worked averaged 40.9 hours for hired workers during the 
survey week, up 1 percent from a year ago. All NASS reports are 
available free of charge on the internet. For access, go to the NASS 
Home Page at: http:/www.usda.gov/nass/. Sp Sy 8 (8-06).
 GEnETICALLy MODIFIED ORGAnISMS. From 2001 
to 2003, four companies received permits from APHIS to grow 
corn	and	sugarcane	in	Hawaii	which	was	genetically	modified	to	
produce pharmaceutical products. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
permits were improperly granted by APHIS in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental 
Policy	Act	(NEPA).		APHIS	argued	that	the	permits	had	sufficient	
restrictions to avoid any environmental contamination. The court 
held that APHIS acted in “utter disregard” of the ESA, and also 
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), by failing 
to conduct even preliminary investigations prior to its approval of 
the permits. A separate hearing will be held on the issue of remedies. 
Center for Food Safety v. Johanns, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56632 
(D. Hawaii 2006).
 PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT. 
The	plaintiff	had	worked	for	a	produce	packing	firm	for	over	a	
decade,	eventually	becoming	a	director,	officer	and	shareholder	
of the company.  The company was found to have violated PACA 
by failing to pay for produce promptly and the plaintiff was 
held to be a responsible person connected with the company, 
resulting in limitations on the plaintiff’s employment with other 
produce handlers. The plaintiff argued that the plaintiff was only 
nominally	an	officer,	director	and	shareholder	of	 the	company	
because	 another	officer	had	 the	power	 to	 remove	 the	plaintiff	
from the company. The court held that the plaintiff was not a 
nominal	officer,	director	and	shareholder	in	the	company	because	
the plaintiff had several years of experience with the company, 
performed important tasks for the company, and participated in 
board	meetings	sufficiently	to	understand	the	company’s	financial	
condition.  Thames v. U.S.D.A., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20892 
(11th Cir. 2006).
 WAREHOUSES. The FSA, Warehouse and Inventory 
Division, has announced the conditions under which temporary 
storage space may be licensed for the 2006 crops of wheat, corn, 
and grain sorghum.  Upon written application, the FSA will 
continue to authorize and license the use of temporary grain 
storage space. Such space may be used from the time of initial 
licensing until July 1, 2007. Temporary grain storage structures 
must be operated in conjunction with a USWA-licensed grain 
warehouse.  In addition: (1) an asphalt, concrete, or other approved 
base material must be used; (2) rigid self-supporting sidewalls 
must be used; (3) aeration must be provided; (4) acceptable 
covering, as determined by FSA, must be provided; (5) grain 
must be fully insured for all losses; (6) warehouse operators must 
meet	all	financial	and	bonding	requirements	of	the	USWA;	(7)	
warehouse operators must maintain a separate record of all grain 
stored in temporary grain storage space and must account for 
such grain in the Daily Position Record. USWA licensees should 
direct questions regarding the use of temporary grain storage to 
Terry Chapman, Chief, Licensing Branch, Warehouse License 
and	Examination	Division,	at:	Kansas	City	Commodity	Office,	
Mail Stop 9148, P.O. Box 419205, Kansas City, MO 64141-6205. 
Telephone: 816-926-6474; Facsimile: 816-926-1774, E-mail: 
terry.chapman@kcc.usda.gov. 
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AnD GIFT  TAXATIOn
 CHARITABLE DEDUCTIOn. The taxpayer established a 
charitable remainder trust which provided annual payments to a 
charity with any excess income distributed to the taxpayer. After 
the taxpayer’s spouse’s death, any remaining assets were to be 
distributed to the charity.  The taxpayer’s spouse and children 
served as trustees and the taxpayer, the spouse and the children 
had the power to designate or change the remainder charitable 
beneficiary.	The	 taxpayer,	 spouse	 and	 children	 renouced	 their	
interests	 in	 the	 trust	 such	 that	 the	 remainder	 beneficiary	was	
irrevocable. The IRS ruled that the renunciation of the taxpayer’s, 
spouse’s and children’s interests in the trusts were gifts eligible 
for the gift tax charitable deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 200630006, April 
14, 2006; Ltr. Rul. 200631006, April 14, 2006.
.
 IRA. The decedent’s estate included several IRAs which had 
the	 decedent’s	 estate	 as	 the	 beneficiary.	The	 decedent’s	will	
provided for a portion of the residuary estate to pass to a charity 
and the executor elected to distribute some of the IRAs to the charity 
in satisfaction of his bequest. The IRS ruled that the distribution was 
not a transfer under I.R.C. § 691(a)(2); therefore, only the charity 
would include in income any income in respect of decedent involved 
in the IRAs distributed.  Ltr. Rul. 200633009, May 16, 2006.
 POWER OF APPOInTMEnT. Before, September 1985, the 
decedent’s will created irrevocable trusts for the decedent’s children. 
The	 trusts	 gave	 the	 beneficiary,	 upon	 approval	 of	 the	 trustee,	 the	
power to appoint  interests in the trust property or income to the 
beneficiary’s	 spouse	 or	 living	descendants.	One	 child	 beneficiary	
exercised the power and transferred the trust to two trusts, one for 
each	of	the	beneficiary’s	children.	The	IRS	ruled	that	the	beneficiary	
did not have a general power of appointment of the trust because the 
trust	could	be	appointed	only	to	the	beneficiary’s	spouse	and	lineal	
descendants; therefore the exercise of the power did not result in the 
trust	property	being	included	in	the	beneficiary’s	estate.	In	addition,	
because the trust was established prior to September 1985 and 
because the exercise of the power of appointment did not constitute 
a constructive addition to the trust, the trust assets remained exempt 
from generation-skipping transfer tax.  Ltr. Rul. 200631009, April 
28, 2006.
 VALUATIOn. The taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a family 
limited partnership with their children. The taxpayers assigned 
interests in the partnership to several assignees pursuant to an 
agreement that contained a formula clause that (1) the taxpayers’ 
children,	trusts	for	their	benefit,	and	a	charitable	organization,	received	
interests having an aggregate fair market value of a set dollar amount, 
and (2) another charitable organization received any remaining 
portion of the assigned interests. The taxpayers’ children agreed to 
pay all transfer taxes resulting from the transaction, including the 
estate tax liability under I.R.C. § 2035(c) that would arise if one or 
both of the taxpayers were to die within three years after the date of 
the assignments. Under a second agreement, the assignees allocated 
the assigned interests among themselves in accordance with the 
formula clause, based on an agreed aggregate value for the assigned 
interests. Less than six months after the date of the assignment, the 
partnership redeemed the interests of the charitable organizations 
pursuant to a call option contained in the partnership agreement. The 
Tax Court held that the fair market value of the limited partnership 
interests transferred by the taxpayers were determined by applying a 
15 percent minority interest discount and a 20 percent marketability 
discount. The partnership interests transferred by each of the taxpayers 
was valued as an assignee interest because, under applicable Texas 
law, the partnership agreement, and the assignment agreement, only 
economic rights in the partnership were assigned and there was no 
indication that the partners explicitly consented to admit the assignees 
as partners. The Tax Court also held that the value of the gifts was 
not	reduced	to	reflect	the	donees’	contingent	obligation	to	pay	the	
additional estate tax that would have been imposed on account of 
I.R.C. § 2035 if the taxpayers had died within three years of the gift. 
Such an adjustment was not appropriate because the taxpayers failed 
to demonstrate that their valuation of such an obligation was reliable. 
On appeal the appellate court reversed the second holding, ruling that 
the valuation used by the estate was correct to discount the value of 
the gifts by the amount of estate tax assumed by the donees.  McCord 
v. Comm’r, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,530 (5th Cir. 2006), 
rev’g, 120 T.C. 358 (2003).
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 FEDERAL InCOME
TAXATIOn
 ALTERnATIVE MInIMUM TAX. The taxpayer had received 
incentive stock options from an employer. The stock was later sold 
for a loss, based on the value of the stock when acquired and the 
price when sold. The taxpayer sought to include the entire losses 
in calculating alternative minimum tax and to carry back any 
excess losses to offset AMTI for prior tax years. The court held 
that capital losses for AMT purposes were subject to the same 
limitations as capital losses for regular tax purposes. However, 
the court also held that the AMT losses not allowed could not be 
carried forward or back to offset future or past AMTI.  Spitz v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-168.
 AUDITS. The IRS has announced that, beginning September 5, 
2006, the IRS will launch a test program to allow Small Business/
Self-Employed (SB/SE) taxpayers under examination in Chicago, 
Illinois; Houston, Texas; and St. Paul, Minnesota, to use fast track 
settlement to resolve outstanding tax disputes. The program will 
enable	SB/SE	taxpayers	to	work	with	the	IRS	and	the	Office	of	
Appeals to resolve outstanding disputed issues while the case is 
still in SB/SE jurisdiction. At the conclusion of a six-month test 
period, the IRS will evaluate the program and determine whether 
to continue the program for an additional 18 months with taxpayers 
nationwide. The procedures for using FTS for SB/SE taxpayers 
will follow those published for the Large and Mid-Size Business 
Fast Track Settlement Dispute Resolution Program, in Rev. Proc. 
2003-40, 2003-1 C.B. 1044. Ann. 2006-61, I.R.B. 2006-36.
 CAPITAL EXPEnSES. The IRS has issued proposed 
regulations governing the capitalization of amounts paid to acquire, 
produce or improve tangible property under I.R.C. § 263(a).  71 
Fed. Reg. 48589 (Aug. 21, 2006).
 COURT AWARDS AnD SETTLEMEnTS. The taxpayer 
had brought an administrative action against a former employer 
for discrimination and retaliation in terminating the taxpayer’s 
employment for whistle-blowing activities. The state eventually 
awarded the taxpayer compensation for emotional distress and 
anguish and for injury to personal reputation. The taxpayer had 
presented evidence of emotional and physical manifestations of 
stress	due	to	the	termination	of	employment.	The	taxpayer	filed	
an amended return which excluded the award from income based 
on the argument that the award was received for physical injuries. 
The	taxpayer	filed	suit	after	the	IRS	denied	the	taxpayer’s	claim	
and argued that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional in that 
the award was not income under the 16th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. The court held that the taxation of an award 
in compensation for personal injury, whether physical or non-
physical, violated the 16th Amendment which allows taxation 
only of incomes; therefore, the distinction in Section 104(a)(2) 
was unconstitutional. The court noted that the award made no 
mention of any compensation for the taxpayer’s lost wages or any 
other taxable income.  Murphy v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,476 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
 DISASTER LOSSES. On August 4, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Alaska are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of snow melt and 
ice jams, which began on May 13, 2006. FEMA-1657-DR.   On 
August 15, 2006, the president determined that certain areas in 
Texas are eligible for assistance from the government under the 
Act as	a	result	of	flooding,	which	began	on	July	31,	2006.	FEMA-
1658-DR.  Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to these 
disasters may deduct the losses on their 2005 returns
 The IRS has issued Publication 1460, Highlights of Tax Relief 
Provided to Taxpayers in Response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 
and Wilma, which summarizes the tax incentives for rebuilding 
the Gulf Coast.
 EMPLOyEE BEnEFITS. The taxpayer’s employer provided 
a reimbursement medical care expense plan which provided for 
rollover of unused reimbursement amounts. The plan continued 
for a deceased employee’s surviving spouse and dependents. 
On the death of the employee, the employee’s surviving spouse 
and dependents, any unused reimbursement amount was paid 
to	 a	designated	beneficiary	who	was	not	 a	 surviving	 spouse	or	
dependent. The IRS ruled that the reimbursement amounts paid 
under such a plan to the employee, a surviving spouse or dependent 
for medical expenses were included in the employee’s income. The 
IRS also ruled that the unused reimbursement amount paid to a 
designated	beneficiary	was	included	in	the	designated	beneficiary’s	
taxable income. Rev. Rul. 2006-36, I.R.B. 2006-36.
 HyBRID VEHICLE TAX CREDIT.  The IRS has announced 
that	Ford,	Mercury	and	Honda	vehicles	which	have	qualified	for	
the alternative motor vehicle credit under I.R.C. § 30B continue 
to qualify for the credit because these companies have not each 
sold more than 60,000 vehicles as of the previous calendar quarter. 
IR-2006-125; IR-2006-126.
 IRA. The IRS has announced that, under the Heroes Earned 
Retirement Opportunities Act, Pub. L. No. 109-227, tax-free combat 
pay earned by active duty military personnel was considered earned 
income for purposes of determining the contribution amount for 
traditional and Roth IRAs.  IR-2006-129. 
 InSTALLMEnT REPORTInG. Although the taxpayer 
instructed an income tax return preparer to elect to report the gain 
from an installment sale using the installment reporting method, 
the return preparer included all of the gain on the tax return for 
the year of sale. the taxpayer requested an extension of time to 
elect the installment method of reporting the gain from the sale. 
The IRS noted that the tax rate on capital gains was reduced by a 
new law enacted after the tax return was initially due but before 
the	return	was	actually	filed	after	extensions.	The	IRS	noted	that	
a change in tax law would ordinarily prevent any change in an 
election	affected	by	the	new	law,	but	because	the	taxpayer’s	first	
return	was	filed	after	the	new	law	became	effective,	the	taxpayer	
was	granted	an	extension	of	time	to	file	an	amended	return	with	
an election to report the gain on the installment method.  Ltr. Rul. 
200630012, April 28, 2006.
 InTEREST. The taxpayers, husband and wife, operated a tree 
farm and purchased equipment for the business using credit cards. 
The taxpayers deducted the interest paid on the cards as a business 
expense. The taxpayer later obtained a home equity loan and used 
the proceeds to pay off the credit card debts. The taxpayers then 
deducted the interest paid on the equity loan as a business expense. 
The court held that the home equity loan was a replacement debt 
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(1) eligible for the same 
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tax treatment as the original debt.  Alexander v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2006-127.
 The taxpayer had been renting a residence when the taxpayer 
purchased an option to purchase the property. The taxpayer did 
not exercise the option, but the option agreement required the 
taxpayer to pay a monthly amount equal to the owner’s mortgage 
payments, pay insurance premiums and pay real estate taxes. 
The taxpayer claimed interest and real estate tax deductions for 
the residence. The court held that the taxpayer could not claim 
interest and real estate tax deductions because the taxpayer did 
not have an ownership interest in the property.  Jones v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-176.
 LIkE-kInD EXCHAnGES.  The taxpayers owned stock in 
cooperative apartments. The taxpayers sold the stock in exchange 
for real property. The IRS ruled that the stock in the cooperative 
apartments was a real property interest; therefore, the stock 
qualified	as	like-kind	property	with	the	real	property	for	purposes	
of I.R.C. § 1031.  Ltr. Rul. 200631012, April 13, 2006.
 RETURnS. The taxpayers had entered into a same-sex 
marriage in 1971 in Minnesota. Minnesota law prohibits same-sex 
marriages.	The	taxpayers	filed	federal	income	tax	returns	claiming	
the	married	filing	status	and	filing	a	joint	return.	The	taxpayers	
filed	a	claim	for	a	refund	based	on	that	marital	status	which	was	
denied by the IRS which argued that the taxpayers were not legally 
married. The court held that the taxpayers’ claim was properly 
dismissed by the trial court under issue preclusion because the issue 
of the taxpayers’ marriage was held to be prohibited by Minnesota 
law in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), and in McConnell v. Nooner, No. 
4-75-Civ. 566 (D. Minn. April 20, 1976), aff’d, 547 F.2d 54, 56 
(8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Both cases held that the Minnesota 
prohibition of same-sex marriages was constitutional. Thus, the 
taxpayers could not use the marital status (married) for federal 
income tax returns.  McConnell v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,462 (8th Cir. 2006).
 SAFE HARBOR InTEREST RATES
 September 2006
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR  5.13 5.07 5.04 5.02
110 percent AFR 5.66 5.58 5.54 5.52
120 percent AFR 6.17 6.08 6.03 6.00
Mid-term
AFR  5.01 4.95 4.92 4.90
110 percent AFR  5.52 5.45 5.41 5.39
120 percent AFR 6.03 5.94 5.90 5.87
Long-term
AFR 5.21 5.14 5.11 5.09
110 percent AFR  5.73 5.65 5.61 5.58
120 percent AFR  6.27 6.17 6.12 6.09
Rev. Rul. 2006-44, I.R.B. 2006-36.
 S CORPORATIOnS
 NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS. An S corporation adopted 
an employee stock option plan (ESOP). On the date stock was 
distributed to employees, the stock was distributed in batches 
and immediately repurchased by the company in order to prevent 
ownership of stock by more than 100 persons at any one time. The 
next batch of stock was not distributed until the previous batch 
was repurchased. The IRS ruled that the distribution of stock 
throughout the day to more than 100 persons, did not terminate 
the S corporation election because at no time did more than 100 
persons own stock at the same time.  Ltr. Rul. 200633013, May 
10, 2006.
 SALE OF RESIDEnCE. The taxpayers, husband and wife, 
purchased a residence prior to May 1997. The husband was in the 
military and was transferred to another base within two years of 
the purchase. The taxpayers retained the residence and rented it to 
unrelated parties until the taxpayers sold the residence after May 
1997. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled that (1) pre-
May 7, 1997 depreciation taken on the residence as a rental property 
was recaptured and included in the taxpayers’ income (2) post-May 
6, 1997 gain attributable to depreciation taken on the residence was 
included in income, and (3) non-depreciation-related gain on the 
residence was excluded from income under I.R.C. § 121. the IRS 
ruled that, although the taxpayers did not live in the house for the 
required two years, the residency requirement was tolled by the 
husband’s transfer to another base.  CCA Ltr. Rul. 200630015, 
Feb. 16, 2006.
 THEFT LOSSES. The taxpayer claimed a theft loss deduction 
for the loss of several Rolex watches, an automobile and bank 
funds due to the alleged theft of the items by the taxpayer’s nephew. 
The	only	evidence	presented	by	the	taxpayer	was	an	“Affidavit	of	
Judgment	by	Confession”	filed	with	a	state	court	and	signed	by	the	
nephew which stated that the nephew owed the taxpayer the claimed 
value of the items lost but did not confess the theft of the items. 
The court upheld the IRS disallowance of the theft loss deduction 
for lack of substantiation.  Rosen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-
170.
 WAGES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, operated several 
small businesses from their home. The taxpayers’ children 
performed a variety of activities for the businesses and received 
various payments which the taxpayers claimed as a wage deduction. 
the court found that most of the children’s activities were in the 
nature of family chores, the children were not paid on a regular basis 
when the work was performed, the amount paid was determined 
before the work was performed and the taxpayers failed to keep 
records,	 pay	 employment	 taxes	 or	file	 information	 returns.	The	
court held that the amounts paid to the children were not deductible 
wages.  Alexander v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-127.
 TRAVEL EXPEnSES. The taxpayer was employed as a welder 
at a job location away from the taxpayer residence. The taxpayer 
claimed deductions for unreimbursed meal and automobile travel 
expenses involved with the employment.  The taxpayer did not 
have contemporary written records or receipts to substantiate the 
expense deductions and the court upheld the IRS disallowance of 
the deductions for lack of substantiation.  nicely v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2006-172.
PATEnTS
 GEnETICALLy-MODIFIED ORGAnISMS. The plaintiff 
owned a patent on cotton and soybean seed which was genetically-
modified	to	be	resistant	to	glyphosate	(Roundup)	herbicides.	The	
seed was licensed to seed growers. Under the licenses, restrictions 
were placed on the sale of the seed to limit the number of crops 
which could be grown by preventing saving of seed from a crop 
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for future personal use by the buyers of the seed. The defendant 
purchased some of this seed and used it to grow a crop of cotton and 
soybeans. The defendant saved some of the crop to retain the seed 
and used that saved seed to plant subsequent crops. The defendant did 
not sign any licensing agreement when the seed was purchased. The 
plaintiff	filed	suit	for	patent	infringement	and	the	defendant	answered	
that the licensing agreements violated the Sherman Act because 
the sale of the seed was tied to the sale of Roundup. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and the appellate court 
affirmed,	holding	that	the	patent	was	valid,	the	licensing	agreement	
did not allow the unrestricted sale of the seed, and the sale of the 
seed was not improperly tied to the sale of the herbicide Roundup. 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20914 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006), aff’g, 342 F. Supp. 2d 602 (n.D. Miss. 2004).
PRODUCT LIABILITy
 SILO. The plaintiff had purchased a horizontal bunker silo system 
for storing silage. The silage was covered by a plastic sheet but the 
sheet was to be removed when additional silage was added. The 
plaintiff’s long-standing policy was to remove the sheet covering 
silage before adding new silage but that policy was not followed and 
two new silage loads were added with the sheet in place. The plaintiff 
was injured when one of the silage loads shifted and fell because 
of	the	sheets.	The	plaintiff	filed	a	negligence	suit	against	the	sheet	
manufacturer, alleging that the manufacture failed to warn that the 
sheet needed to be removed before adding any new silage. The court 
held that summary judgment for the defendant was properly granted 
because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts that the failure to warn 
caused the accident. The court noted that the plaintiff had a long-
standing policy to remove the sheet; therefore, any warning would 
not have altered the circumstances before the accident. Schreiner 
v. Wieser Concrete Products, Inc., 2006 Wis. App. LEXIS 513 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
 STRAy VOLTAGE. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were 
dairy farmers who sued the defendant electric contractor company 
in negligence and nuisance for damages to their dairy operation 
from stray voltage. The plaintiffs hired the defendant to do electrical 
work in their dairy barn over three years. When the plaintiffs’ cows 
began having milk production problems, the plaintiffs had other 
electrical	contractors	inspect	their	barn	but	the	specific	cause	of	the	
stray	voltage	was	not	definitively	discovered	for	20	years	to	be	
the original work done by the defendant. The defendant moved 
for and received summary judgment at trial on the grounds that 
the suit was barred by the six year statute of limitation imposed 
by Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) because the plaintiffs did not exercise 
reasonable diligence in discovering the problem. The appellate 
court reversed, holding that the determination of whether the 
plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the source 
of the stray voltage was an issue of fact for the jury to decide.  
Michaels v. kettle Moraine Electric, Inc., 2006 Wis. App. 
LEXIS 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
 
SECURED TRAnSACTIOnS
 LAnDLORD’S LIEn. A landowner had leased farm land to a 
husband	and	wife	for	cash	but	the	tenants	encountered	financial	
difficulties	 and	 the	 land	was	 subleased	 to	 the	 plaintiff.	The	
plaintiff paid the entire sublease rent at the start of the sublease; 
however,	the	amount	paid	was	insufficient	to	cover	the	back	rent	
owed	by	the	tenants.	When	the	tenants	filed	for	bankruptcy,	the	
landowner	filed	a	notice	for	a	landowner’s	lien	against	any	crop	
grown on the land. The plaintiff brought suit to release the lien, 
arguing that, because the landowner did not seek payment from 
the tenants, the lien could not be enforced against the plaintiff. 
The landowner brought a counterclaim to enforce the lien and 
collect the back rent against the plaintiff but did not include the 
tenants. The court held that the omission of the tenants from 
the counterclaim did not avoid the landowner’s lien as to the 
plaintiff. The court remanded the case for a determination as to 
whether the failure to join the tenants in the counterclaim was 
a failure to join necessary parties and resulted in an impairment 
of the plaintiff’s rights, given the fact that the plaintiff had paid 
the rent in full to the tenants. The court stated that, if the failure 
to seek payment from the tenants resulted in an impairment of 
the plaintiff’s rights, the lien could be avoided.  McClatchy v. 
Anthony Farms, Inc., 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 592 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2006).
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